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Philosophy of Science that Ignores 
Science: Race, IQ and Heritability* 
Neven Sesardictt 
Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, Hong Kong 
Philosophers of science widely believe that the hereditarian theory about racial differ- 
ences in IQ is based on methodological mistakes and confusions involving the concept 
of heritability. I argue that this "received view" is wrong: methodological criticisms 
popular among philosophers are seriously misconceived, and the discussion in philos- 
ophy of science about these matters is largely disconnected from the real, empirically 
complex issues debated in science. 
Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge. 
Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man 
1. Introduction. Philosophy of science has become increasingly science- 
impregnated. Today, even graduate students who want to specialize in 
philosophy of science are aware that without good acquaintance with the 
relevant parts of science they will simply be unable to write an acceptable 
dissertation, let alone get their work published in refereed journals later. 
Therefore, one surely doesn't expect leading philosophers of science to be 
poorly informed about basic scientific facts in the very domain of their 
philosophical explorations. But I will try to show that, indeed, there is a 
topic where ignorance of science is the rule (with very few exceptions), and 
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where prominent philosophers of science systematically defend claims that 
crumble as soon as they are confronted with the pertinent scientific liter- 
ature. The topic in question is the explanation of racial differences in IQ. 
In trying to document my thesis, I will obviously have to analyze and 
evaluate arguments about some substantive issues but I will not commit 
myself to any of the main rival views in the debate. My goal is merely to 
disclose the docta ignorantia reigning in this small segment of contempo- 
rary philosophy of science. 
2. The "Master Argument." 
2. 1. Whence Between-Group Heritability? Many philosophers of science 
think that there is one particular argument that pinpoints the fundamental 
weakness in the proposed genetic explanation of the black-white IQ dif- 
ference. The argument says that the proponents of the genetic hypothesis 
about the interracial gap in IQ arrive at their conclusion by using a bla- 
tantly fallacious inference. The suggestion is that Arthur Jensen and the 
authors of the Bell Curve believe (wrongly) that from the claim that IQ is 
highly heritable among whites and among blacks it immediately follows 
that the difference in IQ between whites and blacks is also heritable. Once 
the mistake is diagnosed, we are told, the genetic hypothesis loses all its 
credibility. Here are some characteristic quotations: 
... the existence of significant heritability for IQ within the pop- 
ulations that have been studied does not imply that average IQ dif- 
ferences between races are in whole or in any part due to genetic dif- 
ferences.... Various writers-the most prominent being Arthur 
Jensen . . . -have taken the heritability of IQ to show that these dif- 
ferences must have a genetic base. No such conclusions follow. (Papi- 
neau 1982, 97) 
On the basis of evidence supporting a high heritability value within 
a subpopulation, Jensen infers that heritability will be (correspond- 
ingly?) high in the population as a whole, and that variation between 
groups has a (correspondingly?) high genetic basis. ... But there is 
no intrinsic connection between the magnitude of the heritability 
within groups and the magnitude of between-group differences. (Rich- 
ardson 1984, 401, 406) 
Arthur Jensen's 1969 article in the Harvard Educational Review 
started off a current controversy by arguing from heritability within 
whites to genetic differences between whites and blacks. In 1970 Rich- 
ard Lewontin gave a graphic example that illustrates why this is a 
mistake. (Block 1995, 110) 
The [hereditarian] argument is based on the assumption that if IQ 
has high [heritability] in two different populations, then it can be con- 
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cluded that the difference in mean IQ between the two populations 
also has a high group heritability. (Sarkar 1998, 93) 
See also Daniels 1976, 143-144, 173-174. 
Helen Longino appears to subscribe to the same view because she finds 
Richardson's analysis "persuasive" and "compelling." (Longino 1990, 8- 
9) Since the same argument also occupies a central place in Block (1995), 
and since Philip Kitcher describes Block's article as "the single best di- 
agnosis of the flaws of Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's The Bell 
Curve" (Kitcher 1998, 51), it seems fair to include Kitcher among those 
who endorse it.1 
The simple argument that has impressed philosophers of science so 
much2 was first used by Richard Lewontin ([1970] 1976) in his criticism of 
Jensen. Ever since, Jensen's views have been routinely dismissed by rehears- 
ing Lewontin's well-known example with two handfuls of seed taken from 
the same, genetically heterogeneous sample and then planted in two differ- 
ent soils (rich and poor in nutrients): as a result, the phenotypic differences 
within each of the two groups of plants will be 100 percent heritable, but the 
difference between the two groups will be entirely due to differences in two 
environments (zero heritability). The moral triumphantly drawn from that 
example is: "You just cannot establish between-group heritability on the 
basis of within-group heritability!" Indeed, this is correct. The only question 
is whether Jensen was really unaware of that elementary truth. 
Richardson for one found it amazing that Jensen could have been so 
"blind." And he offered the following explanation: 
How might we explain this blindness on Jensen's part? It is exactly 
here that the point that his doctrine is a racist doctrine-as it mani- 
festly is-enters in. The latent racism explains the persistence of the 
view despite its manifest untenability on scientific grounds. (Richard- 
son 1984, 407) 
It is regrettable that philosophers are not more cautious before they 
resort to the heavy artillery of political accusations. If it seems that a 
respected scholar has been "blind" about something very simple and ele- 
mentary, minimal fairness requires that you think twice (and read twice) 
in order to make sure that perhaps it was not you who misunderstood the 
person in question. I will try to show that in this particular case Richard- 
1. Here is another consideration showing that the inclusion of Kitcher is justified: Rose, 
Lewontin and Kamin (1984, 117-118) use the same argument against Jensen, and 
Kitcher describes their chapter on intelligence as "brilliant", "lucid", "thorough" and 
"devastating." (Kitcher 1984, 9) 
2. As a referee for Philosophy of Science said: "This argument has become practically 
canonical in our profession." 
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son jumped the gun, and that a closer look at the texts resolves the problem 
in a way that does not necessitate a speculation about Jensen's political 
motives. More generally, I will claim that Lewontin's "master argument" 
is really a red herring that has directed the philosophical discussion away 
from the real issues for the last thirty years. 
Let me start by describing three possible ways of arguing from WGH 
(within-group heritability) to BGH (between-group heritability). 
(H1) High WGH entails a non-zero BGH. 
(H2) High WGH, by itself, inductively establishes a non-zero BGH. 
(H3) High WGH, together with some collateral empirical informa- 
tion,inductively establishes a non-zero BGH. 
While serious hereditarianism actually involves commitment to H3, Le- 
wontin and the philosophers of science following in his footsteps have 
persistently criticized H1 (or occasionally H2), with the unfortunate result 
that they simply never managed to get in contact with the real hereditarian 
argument (which aims to support H3). 
When Lewontin says, for example, that "[t]he fundamental error of 
Jensen's argument is to confuse heritability of a character within a popu- 
lation with heritability of the difference between two populations" (Le- 
wontin 1976, 89; italics added), or that "[t]here is, in fact, no valid [sic] 
way to reason from [WGH] to [BGH]" (Rose, Lewontin, and Kamin 1984, 
118), this only makes sense as an attack on H1. Again, his assertion that 
"[t]he genetic basis of the difference between two populations bears no 
logical or empirical relation to the heritability within populations and can- 
not be inferred from it . . . " (Lewontin 1976, 89; italics added) is best 
understood as a criticism of H,1 or perhaps H2. Furthermore, accusing 
Jensen of the "manifestly incorrect claim" (Lewontin 1975, 399) and "el- 
ementary error" (402) sounds more like suggesting an outrageous, inex- 
cusable blunder (like H1) than like disputing a fairly complex, empirically 
based bit of reasoning (like H3) where there might be room for disagree- 
ment among reasonable and competent people. 
Finally, and most importantly, the very fact that Lewontin thinks that 
he can disprove a connection between WGH and BGH by merely using 
his famous example with two handfuls of seed (Lewontin 1976, 89; Rose, 
Lewontin and Kamin 1984, 118; see also Block 1995, 110) shows that the 
target here cannot be H3. For, although his thought experiment does per- 
suasively demonstrate the logical fallaciousness of any attempt to imme- 
diately derive non-zero BGH from high WGH (a' la H1), it is by itself 
irrelevant for the evaluation of a much more sophisticated hypothesis3 
(embodied in H3). 
3. In fairness to Lewontin, it should be pointed out that, besides discussing heritability, 
he does also briefly address the question whether "the lack of effect of correction for 
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The bad news for the critics inspired by Lewontin's conceptual line of 
attack on hereditarianism is that Jensen in fact never intended to defend 
H1 (or H2). I will first support this interpretation by quoting from Jensen's 
publications. Later, I will exhibit the logical structure of his real argument 
(that happens to be a version of H3). 
The first indication that Lewontin's argument may have missed the 
mark badly is Jensen's reaction in his exchange with Lewontin: 
The main thrust of Lewontin's argument, as he sees it, actually 
attacks only a straw man set up by himself: the notion that heritability 
of a trait within a population does not prove that genetic factors are 
involved in the mean difference between two different populations on 
the same trait. I agree. But nowhere in my Harvard Educational Re- 
view discussion of race differences do I propose this line of reasoning, 
nor have I done so in any other writings. (Jensen 1976, 103) 
Of course, we don't have to take Jensen's word here but if an author 
protests that his views are distorted this certainly constitutes a good reason 
to proceed cautiously and explore the matter in more detail. An additional 
sign that something may have gone awry with Lewontin's understanding 
of Jensen is the following comment of the geneticist James Crow in the 
earliest round of comments on Jensen's 1969 paper: "Strictly, as Jensen 
mentions, there is no carryover from within-population studies to between- 
population conclusions." (Crow 1969, 159; italics added) So, what Le- 
wontin accuses Jensen of not seeing is the same thing that in Crow's opin- 
ion Jensen not only saw but mentioned as well! The best way to resolve 
this odd disagreement is to go directly to what Jensen actually wrote: 
So all we are left with are various lines of evidence, no one of which 
is definitive alone, but which, viewed all together, make it a not unrea- 
sonable hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly implicated in the 
average Negro-white intelligence difference. (Jensen 1969a, 80; italics 
added) 
This statement4 is manifestly incompatible with the belief (attributed to 
gross socioeconomic class" might be "presumptive evidence" for hereditarianism. 
(1976, 91) But in this short discussion he nowhere shows that he recognizes how Jensen 
harnesses global empirical evidence to work together with high WGH to build the 
hereditarian case (vide infra). For Jensen, both the relative weakness of environmental 
influences on IQ and high WGH are essential parts of the inference to non-zero BGH. 
Disputing these two premises separately (as Lewontin does) is an ignoratio elenchi. 
4. Interestingly, Lewontin quotes a section containing that very statement but he refuses 
to take it at face value and says that this "cant" needs to be "translated into common 
English." (Lewontin 1976, 89) In the "translation" he then proposes the crucial part of 
Jensen's statement is lost. 
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Jensen by many of his critics) that within-group heritability alone is suf- 
ficient to establish the between-group heritability. Indeed, immediately 
after mentioning "various lines of evidence" Jensen clarifies his position 
further by summarizing six different empirical arguments that, in his opin- 
ion, together with the high within-group heritability of IQ lend support to 
the genetic explanation of the between-group difference. 
Addressing the relation between within-group heritability and between- 
group heritability, Jensen made essentially the same point in many of his 
other writings. For example: 
I have explained in greater detail elsewhere [1968] that heritability 
coefficients by themselves cannot answer the question of genetic differ- 
ences between groups, but when used along with additional informa- 
tion concerning the amount of relevant environmental variations 
within groups and overlap between groups, can enter into the for- 
mulation of testable hypotheses that could reduce the heredity- 
environment uncertainty concerning group differences. (1969b, 220; 
italics added) ... other methods than heritability analysis are required 
to test the hypothesis that racial group differences in a given trait 
involve genetic factors and to determine their extent. (1973b, 411) ... 
Although one cannot formally generalize from within-group herita- 
bility to between-groups heritability, the evidence from studies of 
within-group heritability does, in fact, impose severe constraints on 
some of the most popular environmental theories of the existing racial 
and social class differences in educational performance. (1973a, 1; ital- 
ics added. See also: 1968, 95; 1973a, 135-139; 1981b, 502-504; 1982, 
126; 1994, 905; 1998, 445-463) 
In mainstream philosophy of science, Lewontin's argument against Jensen 
is repeated ad nauseam, but Jensen's response, if mentioned at all, is dis- 
missed without being properly explained, let alone evaluated or critically 
considered. To the best of my knowledge, in no other context have phi- 
losophers of science demonstrated a systematic bias of that magnitude in 
presenting the ongoing scientific debate. 
The most surprising thing is that the charge against Jensen (that he 
tried to infer BGH immediately from WGH) is routinely made and then 
readily transmitted further, without anyone feeling an obligation to pro- 
duce textual evidence for that attribution. And when, exceptionally, some- 
one does attempt to provide a supporting quotation it turns out that he 
is actually unable to deliver: 
Does high IQ heritability in the white population, combined with 
a 15 point black-white mean difference, permit us to conclude any- 
thing about the reasons for, or causes of, the IQ gap? Jensen (1972, 
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p. 163) clearly believes it does: "It is not an unreasonable hypothesis 
that genetic factors are strongly implicated in the average Negro- 
White intelligence differences." (Daniels 1976, 173) 
Contrary to what is being suggested here, the quotation from Jensen only 
confirms that he advocates the non-zero BGH hypothesis; it certainly does 
not show that he inferred it directly from WGH (as Daniels implies). 
It is worth stressing that even those who did not read Jensen still had 
an alternative and very easy way to acquire better understanding of the 
position they dismissed so hastily. Merely consulting the writings of more 
sophisticated environmentalists and opponents of Jensen would have been 
quite sufficient to realize the hollowness of Lewontin's "refutation". Sur- 
prisingly, this avenue has not been used either. 
Among those currently defending the environmentalist explanation of 
the racial IQ gap a leading authority is James Flynn. At the beginning of 
his academic career Flynn was attracted to the debate by the desire to 
prove that Jensen was wrong, and indeed he ended up providing some 
interesting arguments against hereditarianism. But despite disagreeing 
with Jensen, Flynn does not think that Jensen's view is the product of 
conceptual confusion, methodological fallacies or racism. He takes pains 
to correct the widespread misinterpretations, and insists that Jensen never 
made the elementary mistake of inferring the genetic explanation of the 
between-group difference only on the basis of the high heritability of 
within-group differences: 
[Jensen] does not believe that [heritability] estimates alone can de- 
cide the issue of genetic versus environmental hypotheses. However, 
he argues that the probability of a genetic hypothesis will be much 
enhanced if, in addition to evidencing high [heritability], we find we 
can falsify literally every plausible environmental hypothesis one by 
one. He challenges social scientists who believe in an environmental 
explanation of the IQ gap between the races to bring their hypotheses 
forward. Given his competence and the present state of the social 
sciences, the result is something of a massacre.... Far too many of 
Jensen's critics have not taken up the challenge to refute him in any 
serious way, rather they have elected for various forms of escape, the 
most popular of which has been to seize on an argument put forward 
by the distinguished Harvard geneticist Richard C. Lewontin. (Flynn 
1980, 40, 54) 
Although Flynn's excellent book Race, IQ and Jensen came out in 1980, 
there is no reference to it in philosophical works addressing the same topic 
that were published later. This is a curious omission because Flynn's subtle 
methodological analysis of the whole debate is a kind of contribution that 
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should be of special interest to philosophers of science. In particular, after 
Flynn's powerful and very detailed criticism of Lewontin's argument it is 
rather odd to see scholars defending that same argument with undimin- 
ished fervor and without any apparent awareness of the grave objections 
raised against it.5 
Now, the best way to see why Lewontin's argument does not work is 
to be acquainted with the basics of Jensen's real stance. I will here briefly 
present an interpretation of Jensen's essential position that is both en- 
dorsed by Jensen himself and widely accepted by other scholars, heredi- 
tarians and environmentalists alike. 
The most important thing to recognize at the outset is that Jensen's 
inference proceeds in two steps. The first step consists in arguing for the 
substantial within-group heritability of IQ. But this is only the first step. 
Contrary to what Lewontin and his philosopher-followers suggest, Jensen 
in fact never claimed that this step by itself established (deductively or 
inductively) that the between-group differences are also heritable. Rather, 
Jensen thinks that high WGH puts severe constraints on admissible envi- 
ronmentalist explanations of the between-group differences in IQ. And 
then, in the second step, he argues on empirical grounds that, given these 
constraints, none of the proposed environmentalist hypotheses remains 
plausible. 
Here is Jensen's argument in a schematic form. 
(A) High WGH of IQ (among both whites and blacks). 
(B) Empirical data (mainly about the relation of certain environmen- 
tal variables and IQ). 
(C) Non-zero BGH. 
Critics charge that (C) cannot be inferred from (A). Granted. But mak- 
ing this point comes nowhere near addressing the real hereditarian argu- 
ment, which tries to reach (C) on the basis of both (A) and (B). 
Another thing to keep in mind here: conceding that (C) cannot be in- 
ferred from (A) alone, deductively or probabilistically, should not be taken 
to mean (as it sometimes is) that (A) is evidentially irrelevant for the truth 
of (C). Jensen's basic claim is that given (A), the empirical information in 
(B) makes (C) more plausible than (not-C). If (A) were false, however, he 
thinks that (B) would lose at least some of its force as a reason for ac- 
5. Flynn later softened his attitude toward Lewontin (Flynn 1989, 365-366) mainly 
because he thought that he had himself discovered empirical evidence pointing to a 
possibly workable Lewontin-like scenario. This idea itself has serious problems (see 
Nichols 1987) but even if it were accepted, Flynn's basic argument against Lewontin's 
aprioristic attack on hereditarianism would still remain absolutely cogent. 
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cepting (C). So, in this picture, (A) is an essential argumentative part of 
the case for (C) although (A) is by itself insufficient to establish (C). 
Admittedly, at several places Jensen does say that high WGH increases 
the probability of non-zero BGH (1973a, 135, 144; 1973b, 408; 1976, 104), 
but on closer reading it becomes clear that he actually never commits 
himself to the claim that high WGH, by itself, inductively establishes non- 
zero BGH. Here is how Jensen explains the reason for postulating the 
probabilistic relation between WGH and BGH: "In nature, characteristics 
that vary genetically among individuals within a population also generally 
vary genetically between different breeding populations of the same spe- 
cies." (1973b, 408; cf. 1969a, 80; 1973a, 130) He suggests that, as a rule 
(with almost no exceptions), high WGH of a trait is in nature accompanied 
by non-zero BGH, and he moreover states that this strong empirical as- 
sociation is regarded as a well established fact by geneticists. These claims 
were never seriously disputed either by Lewontin or by philosophers of 
science opposing hereditarianism. However, Jensen warns explicitly that 
even if the general probabilistic relation between WGH and BGH is con- 
ceded, high WGH still does not allow any determinate conclusion about 
BGH with respect to a particular trait: additional empirical evidence is 
necessary. He concludes the relevant section with a cautionary remark: 
"As I have pointed out elsewhere, other methods than heritability analysis 
are required to test the hypothesis that racial group differences in a given 
trait involve genetic factors and to determine their extent." (1973b, 411; 
italics added) 
Now moving forward from the schematic version, let us flesh out Jen- 
sen's argument. There are two fundamentally different strategies of de- 
fending the environmentalist explanation of the racial IQ gap. Jensen tries 
to show that neither of these strategies looks plausible when high within- 
group heritability is combined with additional empirical evidence. The first 
strategy attempts to explain the difference between the two groups by 
invoking environmental factors that vary within the groups and that there- 
fore enter into the calculation of WGH. Since these factors exhibit a 
within-group variation, I will call this type of environmentalist explana- 
tion "VE theory" (VE = variable environments). The second strategy tries 
to explain the between-group difference by postulating a factor that has 
no within-group variance but which is consistently present in one group 
and consistently absent in the other one. Following Jensen, I will label this 
kind of environmentalist explanation "X-factor theory". Let me first take 
up the VE theories. 
2.2. VE Theories. Are VE theories automatically refuted by the mere 
fact of high WGH? It depends. If WGH is 100% the answer is yes. For, 
if WGH is 100% this means that differences in VE-factors have no effect 
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on IQ variation within groups, and hence they cannot account for any 
part of the observed between-group difference in IQ either. On the other 
hand, if WGH is high but less than 100% then it is still possible that 
differences in (within-group) variable environments may explain the 
between-group difference in its entirety. This is in principle possible, but 
additional empirical evidence may rule out this possibility too. 
High WGH tells us that most of the within-group variance in IQ is 
caused by genetic differences, and that environmental differences in VE 
factors are comparatively weak causes. Although they are not causally 
impotent, VE differences have relatively small effects. But then and this 
is crucial for understanding the relevance of WGH-if VE differences are 
indeed so weak as causes the following is true: for the between-group 
difference to be fully explained by VE factors the two groups must mu- 
tually differ with respect to these VE factors to a very large extent. The 
difference in VE required for the complete environmentalist explanation 
can be so large that, in the light of available data about the group differ- 
ences in VE, the very hypothesis will sometimes be seen as empirically 
hopeless. The following table6 shows the rising constraints that increased 
within-group heritability puts on pure between-group environmentalism: 
TABLE 1. The Rising Constraints 
Heritability 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Required VE-difference 1 1.05 1.12 1.19 1.29 1.41 1.58 1.82 2.24 3.16 - 
The values in the bottom row represent the number of standard deviations 
(of the distribution of the environmental component of IQ) required for 
explaining the total IQ gap.7 
So, if heritability is 40% (or 60% or 80% respectively) the VE difference 
required to explain the whole IQ gap by environmental causes becomes 
1.29 SD (or 1.58 or 2.24). The higher heritability, the heavier burden on 
purely environmentalist accounts. The gist of Jensen's position is precisely 
this two-barreled argument. He says, first, that high WGH compels radical 
environmentalists to postulate very big VE differences between the groups 
and, secondly, that empirical observation shows that these enormous hy- 
pothesized differences are simply not there. 
6. After having compiled this table I found out that Jensen gives a similar tabulation 
in 1998, 455. (There is an obvious misprint in his text, though: the required VE differ- 
ence for the heritability of 40% should be 1.29 and not 1.77.) 
7. These values are in each case obtained by dividing the entire inter-group IQ difference 
(15 points) by the respective standard deviation (SD) of the environmental component 
of IQ variance. The latter magnitude is inversely dependent on heritability, and is easily 
ascertainable once heritability is fixed. 
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Although this is the barest outline of Jensen's argument I hope it shows 
how essentially his hereditarian conclusion rests on the empirical evalua- 
tion and eventual rejection of different versions of VE-environmentalism. 
He carefully considered many prima facie promising attempts to account 
for the black-white IQ difference in terms of VE-factors like SES, educa- 
tional inequality, malnutrition, teacher expectations, childrearing prac- 
tices, pre-natal and peri-natal disadvantages8 etc. (see e.g. Jensen 1981a, 
214-226; 1994, 905-906). But in the end he concluded that the explanatory 
burden imposed on these hypotheses by high heritability was too heavy 
and that these environmentalist hypotheses, singly and collectively, fell far 
short of explaining the total between-group IQ variance. From this brief 
exposition of Jensen's line of reasoning it should be obvious that the sug- 
gestion that Jensen derived BGH directly from a single premise (WGH) 
introduces a ridiculous caricature of hereditarianism that is as easy to 
refute as it is meaningless to discuss. 
2.3. X-Factor Theories. What Lewontin's example with two batches of 
seed in different environments does show is that even in the case of 100% 
within-group heritability the between-group heritability can still be zero. 
Bear in mind, however, that this can happen only if the phenotypic dif- 
ferences between the two groups are caused by an environmental factor 
that has no within-group variance at all. (Jensen calls this type of postu- 
lated environmental influence the "X-factor".) Hence, complete heredi- 
tarianism about within-group differences is logically compatible with com- 
plete environmentalism about between-group differences. All right. But 
Lewontin himself and too many of his ardent supporters thought that the 
example proved something much stronger, viz. that within-group herita- 
bility is entirely irrelevant for assessing between-group heritability. This is 
wrong. As Flynn says: "[T]he real message of Lewontin's example is that 
we can ignore high [heritability] only if there exists a highly specific and 
highly unusual set of circumstances. Therefore, it is absurd to say that 
high [heritability] estimates within black and white respectively are irrel- 
evant. Their relevance consists precisely of this: they force us to look for 
a plausible candidate for the role of [X-factor]." (Flynn 1980, 58-59) 
As both Flynn and Jensen point out, in reality it may be very difficult 
to find a plausible candidate for the role of X-factor. Namely, this factor 
ought to be uniformly present in one group and uniformly absent in the 
other group, and furthermore it should manifest no variation inside either 
8. Given Jensen's thorough-going efforts to take seriously every suggested environmen- 
tal influence and discuss its empirical status in detail, it must come as a surprise that 
Ned Block could accuse him of basing his judgment on "selected facts" and on "ex- 
cluding information about blacks' less favorable environments". (Block 1974) 
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group. For this reason, SES and educational inequalities (the usual sus- 
pects in the puzzle of racial difference in IQ) are automatically excluded 
in this kind of scenario because they obviously have a significant variance 
within both whites and blacks. The same is true of some other popular 
candidates for X-factor account, and all this shows that the search will by 
no means be easy. Indeed, high within-group heritability can so severely 
constrain the X-factor theorizing as to make this type of environmentalism 
exceptionally vulnerable to disconfirmation. This is exactly what Jensen 
was trying to demonstrate. And here again he certainly did not argue in 
favor of the genetic hypothesis by relying solely on the fact of high within- 
group heritability of IQ but by also extensively analyzing the empirical 
credentials of prospective X-factor hypotheses, and by finding them sorely 
wanting. 
At first it might seem that there is actually an environmental factor that 
fits the bill smoothly: discrimination. The reasoning is straightforward. 
Blacks are as a group exposed to pervasive discrimination and racism trig- 
gered by their skin color, whereas whites are never disadvantaged by the 
same kind of social prejudice targeted at their group. Therefore, the ar- 
gument goes, since this environmental difference operates at the group 
level (exactly as an X-factor should) it forces itself upon us as a highly 
probable explanation of the inter-group difference in IQ. A great number 
of people have found that argument supremely convincing. But on second 
thought (if there happens to be a second thought, that is) the idea faces 
serious difficulties. Despite being initially quite plausible, the suggestion 
that discrimination is an easy answer to the racial IQ gap is flatly rejected 
by more sophisticated environmentalists as being "simply an escape from 
hard thinking and hard research": 
But this is simply an escape from hard thinking and hard research. 
Racism is not some magic force that operates without a chain of cau- 
sality. Racism harms people because of its effects and when we list 
those effects, lack of confidence, low self-image, emasculation of the 
male, the welfare mother home, poverty, it seems absurd to claim that 
any one of them does not vary significantly within both black and 
white America. (Flynn 1980, 60) 
Put differently, although discrimination at first looks like an X-factor 
it may turn out to that it can plausibly operate only through mechanisms 
involving a host of VE-factors. This shows why thoughtful environmen- 
talists don't rush to embrace the explanation by discrimination when in- 
vited by Jensen to try that route, and why instead they immediately sense 
danger and feel like being offered "a poisoned apple, an escape that looks 
attractive but proves fatal." (Flynn 1999b, 13) 
All said, though, one should not conclude that purely environmentalist 
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scenarios (either of VE or X-factor variety) are ruled out of court. What 
the foregoing discussion was meant to show is just that high within-group 
heritability changes the terms of the debate in the sense that it puts ad- 
ditional obstacles in the path of pure environmentalism about group dif- 
ferences. Given the limited objectives of this paper no opinion is expressed 
about whether environmentalists can overcome these obstacles or not. 
2.4. Coda. The environmentalist criticism of hereditarianism that dom- 
inates contemporary philosophy of science is so crude and ill-founded that 
it simply does not connect with the best discussions in the field. The issues 
are immensely more complicated than what philosophers typically think. 
Ned Block, the leading philosophical authority on the questions of race, 
IQ, and heritability insists that the hereditarian position relies on "con- 
ceptual confusions" (1995, 99), "flawed logic" (110) and "mistake" (ibid.). 
I tried to show that, on the contrary, hereditarianism is a perfectly legit- 
imate hypothesis: the alleged flawed logic and conceptual confusions are 
in this case just in the eyes of the beholders (Lewontin, Block, Richardson, 
and others). Properly interpreted, hereditarianism is a carefully argued 
and methodologically sound theory. 
Needless to say, this does not mean that it is true or that it should be 
accepted. The only reasonable way to take sides about this issue is to 
painstakingly examine the rich empirical material accumulated in the last 
several decades and to explore different lines of argument based on avail- 
able data. There is no philosophical road to truth about these things. 
Knowledgeable environmentalists today are well aware that they cannot 
win the debate by just relying on the "intuitive plausibility" of their view, 
and by arguing that any other answer must be the product of muddled 
thinking or racism (or both). 
I hope I have demonstrated in this section that Lewontin and the phi- 
losophers who followed him "refuted" Jensen by first distorting his posi- 
tion beyond recognition and that afterwards all went quite effortlessly. 
Ned Block does the same thing with The Bell Curve. He starts by at- 
tributing to Herrnstein and Murray the following principle (a version of 
the "from within-group to between-group" fallacy): 
if a characteristic is largely genetic and there is an observed difference 
between two groups, then there is 'highly likely' . . . to be a genetic 
difference between the two groups that goes in the same direction as 
the observed difference. (Block 1995, 102) 
According to him this principle "underlies all of Herrnstein's and Mur- 
ray's thinking even though it is never articulated." (Block 1995, 102; italics 
added) This sounds odd. It is not only that Block's attribution, as he 
himself admits, cannot be supported by textual evidence from The Bell 
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Curve. Even worse, Herrnstein and Murray in fact explicitly express a 
statement that goes against that principle, and they moreover put that 
statement in italics9: "That a trait is genetically transmitted in individuals 
does not mean that group differences in that trait are also genetic in origin." 
(Herrnstein and Murray 1994, 298) On the next page they say: "The her- 
itability of individual differences in IQ does not necessarily mean that 
ethnic differences are also heritable." It is fairly clear that what Herrnstein 
and Murray want to say is that within-group information is by itself in- 
sufficient to establish a between-group conclusion. Additional information 
is necessary to make that step, and indeed a few pages later they adduce 
crucial supplementary evidence as the missing argumentative link, such as 
the so-called "Spearman's hypothesis" and the weaknesses of extant en- 
vironmentalist explanations. (301-311) One can of course dispute that 
inference too, but (as I have shown in Jensen's case) as soon as one ac- 
knowledges the essentially two-step structure of the argument the debate 
must turn to empirical matters and one can no longer resort to the quick 
strategy of dismissing hereditarianism as just a crude methodological fal- 
lacy. 
To sum up: in stark contrast with the empirical orientation and aware- 
ness of complexity of the issues that rule among the best advocates of 
environmentalism and hereditarianism, philosophy of science still largely 
lives in its own, socially constructed world. Its practitioners are massively 
beguiled by the belief that hereditarianism can be easily checkmated in a 
couple of moves discovered by conceptual analysis.10 
3. Philosophers at Work: Caveat Lector! Here are three other characteristic 
examples showing why information found in philosophy of science sources 
should be taken with a big grain of salt. 
3.1. Measure for (Mis)measure. In philosophy of science, Gould's book 
The Mismeasure of Man is standardly praised as disclosing serious weak- 
nesses and fallacies of hereditarianism. Here are just a couple of represen- 
tative examples: 
9. Curiously, Block quotes this statement in a footnote (and criticizes it for a reason 
we cannot go into), but he does not seem to notice a tension between that statement 
and the view he arbitrarily tries to impose on its authors. 
10. Mario Bunge suggests that hereditarianism about racial differences in intelligence 
is charlatanism, not science. He says that Jensen's hypothesis that the lower IQ of blacks 
is partly due to genetic factors "was unanimously rejected by the scientific community." 
(Bunge 1996, 106) In actuality, according to the poll of experts in the relevant fields, 
of all the scientists who felt qualified to express a view on that issue, 53% agreed with 
Jensen (Snyderman and Rothman 1988, 129). 
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No one has done as much as Stephen J. Gould to expose race and in- 
telligence studies for the garbage that they often are. (Brown 1998, 5) 
Stephen Jay Gould has lucidly analyzed how filling the skulls with lead 
shot, and comparing the weights of the lead, could easily be infected 
with unconscious biases. (Kitcher 1997, 171) 
Brown urges others to follow in Gould's footsteps and fight bad science in 
the same way. He says that philosophers of science are "uniquely situated" 
to do this job well: "More than anyone else, they have the skills-logical, 
mathematical, statistical, methodological, and many more-to ferret out 
bad science." (Brown 1998, 5) 
Perhaps. But are the views attacked by Gould really bad science? Brown, 
Kitcher and many others have no doubt about this although they provide 
no supporting evidence for this belief other than Gould's authority. How- 
ever, the Mismeasure of Man is quite controversial as a piece of scholarship. 
The reviews of Gould's book in Nature, Science and some other profes- 
sional journals were highly negative and severely critical (see Davis 1986), 
in contrast with typically favorable and laudatory comments in the popular 
press. Therefore, although it still remains perfectly legitimate for philoso- 
phers of science to side with Gould and express their admiration publicly, 
one would expect them at least to notify the reader about the massive pres- 
ence of these strong dissenting voices as well (assuming of course that they 
are aware of them). 
More to the point, however, Gould's central argument against heredi- 
tarians happens to be based on his gross misunderstanding of the position 
he is criticizing. He says, "a reified Spearman's g is still the only promising 
justification for hereditarian theories of mean differences in IQ among hu- 
man groups .... The chimerical nature of g is the rotten core of Jensen's 
edifice, and of the entire hereditarian school." (Gould 1981, 320) In reality, 
Jensen's views on the genetic explanation of racial differences in IQ are to- 
tally independent from the question whether there is only one factor of gen- 
eral intelligence (so-called g). Here is what James Flynn, a consistent critic 
of Jensen, has to say on the matter: 
Gould's book evades all of Jensen's best arguments for a genetic 
component in the black-white IQ gap, by positing that they are depen- 
dent on the concept of g as a general intelligence factor. Therefore, 
Gould believes that if he can discredit g, no more need be said. This is 
manifestly false. Jensen's arguments would bite no matter whether 
blacks suffered from a score deficit on one or 10 or 100 factors. I attri- 
bute no intent or motive to Gould, it is just that you cannot rebut 
arguments if you do not acknowledge and address them. (Flynn 1999a, 
373) 
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Another argument against hereditarianism in the Mismeasure of Man 
has no problems arising from misinterpretation or logical flaws. However, 
it seems to have serious troubles with empirical reality (although the news 
about this is traveling slowly, and has not yet reached mainstream phi- 
losophy of science). The argument that helped make Gould's book famous 
and that left the strongest impression on many readers is certainly his 
criticism of the skull measurements undertaken by the nineteenth century 
scientist Samuel George Morton. Gould claimed that the results of Mor- 
ton's measurements indicating systematic differences in cranial capacity 
between different races were due to Morton's unconscious bias, and ulti- 
mately his racist beliefs: "Morton's summaries are a patchwork of fudging 
and finagling in the clear interest of controlling a priori convictions." 
(Gould 1981, 54) Gould then went on to propose a concrete explanation 
of how the bias worked to distort the measurements, and it is this analysis 
that Kitcher called "lucid". 
Now, elementary logic demands that if you want to argue that some- 
one's mistake is due to some kind of bias or prejudice, you have first to 
be sure that the person really made a mistake. In the case of Morton's 
measurements there appears to be no room for doubt about his having 
made the mistake. For, the idea that human races differ in average cranial 
capacity or brain size sounds to many people like the crudest possible form 
of racist and pseudoscientific belief. But notice that the belief is neverthe- 
less empirical, and that its truth-value cannot be determined by conceptual 
analysis or political condemnation. John S. Michael thought that it was 
worth checking the data, and in 1986 he remeasured the cranial capacities 
of 201 specimens from the Morton Collection. In a paper published in 
Current Anthropology he presented the results, and showed that the dif- 
ferences reported by Morton were basically corroborated by his remea- 
surements. Although Michael had qualms of a more general kind (e.g., 
about the legitimacy of "race" as a biological category), with respect to 
the issue at hand (the craniological data) his conclusion was that he could 
find no indication of the systematic bias Gould ascribed to Morton, and 
that in his opinion "Morton's research was conducted with integrity." 
(Michael 1988, 353) 
Gould's explanation of Morton's "error" in terms of racial bias fails 
for the simple reason that there is no error that needs to be explained (i.e., 
there is no explanandum). In other words, what Morton discovered was a 
genuine difference. Moreover, this fact is accepted today in standard ref- 
erence books (see Sternberg 1982, 773; Brody 1992, 301; Mackintosh 1998, 
184), and even by scholars who are staunch advocates of the environmen- 
talist account of the racial IQ gap. For instance, Ulric Neisser (one of the 
leading critics of the genetic hypothesis and the chair of the American 
Psychological Association Task Force that prepared the report "Intelli- 
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gence: Knowns and Unknowns") did not hide his strong aversion for the 
hereditarian views of J. Philippe Rushton when he said: "I do not have 
the space or the stomach [sic] to reply to all the points raised by Rushton." 
(Neisser 1997, 80) Yet, as a responsible psychologist who knows that this 
kind of dispute is ultimately resolved by empirical verification, he had no 
other choice but to concede that with respect to the racial differences in 
the mean measured sizes of skulls and brains "there is indeed a small 
overall trend in the direction [Lynn and Rushton] describe." (ibid.) This 
lesson in respect for hard empirical data is to be commended to all lovers 
of wisdom. 
3.2 Blocking the Whole View. Ned Block is oddly selective in discussing 
Flynn's views. As we saw, Block endorses Lewontin's "master-argument" 
without any reservation, but inexplicably, in this context he never men- 
tions Flynn's detailed criticism of that same argument. When Flynn de- 
velops his own line against Jensen, however, his ideas suddenly become 
"interesting", and Block draws on them enthusiastically in his attack on 
hereditarianism. Oddly enough, he fails to make it known that Flynn him- 
self would strongly disagree with the idea that hereditarianism should be 
dismissed because of its "conceptual confusions" and "flawed logic." On 
the contrary, Flynn regards Jensen as a formidable opponent whose work 
presents an extremely serious challenge to environmentalism. In the very 
essay which Block cites and uses as a machine de guerre against Jensen, 
here is what Flynn had to say about the debate between Jensen and his 
environmentalist adversaries: 
The result is something of a massacre, with Jensen showing that 
the most cherished environmental hypotheses have been sheer specu- 
lation without a single piece of coherent research in their favor. For 
this alone, all seekers of the truth are greatly in his debt. (Flynn 1987, 
222) 
With this kind of information omitted in Block's presentation, readers 
unacquainted with the literature will undoubtedly get a highly distorted 
picture of the controversy. It is as if Flynn's views have been passed 
through a filter that lets through only the ideas that can be used against 
Jensen and The Bell Curve. 
The same bias is discernible in Block's short summary of the whole 
debate about within-group heritability and the racial gap in IQ. (Block 
1995, 115) In that summary Block mentions only three pieces of empirical 
evidence: the so-called Flynn Effect, the data about caste-like minorities, 
and the relatively small amount of genetic variation between the races. 
Notoriously, these are all the data standardly used to support environ- 
mentalism. Whereas these data are scrupulously discussed in The Bell 
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Curve and then weighed against the contrary empirical information, more 
consistent with hereditarianism, in Block's concise picture of the contro- 
versy there is no place at all for the evidence that threatens environmen- 
talism. 11 
There is another manifestation of Block's partiality. Flynn's argument 
against Jensen (that Block endorses) is based on an observed increase of 
average IQ test scores in many countries in the last several decades the 
phenomenon known as the "Flynn Effect". Flynn's argument about race 
builds on this and goes as follows. Since this secular gain in IQ must be 
due to some environmental causes (about which we are now completely 
in the dark), then there is also a hope that the racial gap in IQ might be 
accounted for in the same way (in terms of some presently unknown en- 
vironmental differences). This is an interesting argument but it is hardly 
to be taken as immediately convincing or methodologically unproble- 
matic, especially not in a contribution that aspires to examine the whole 
debate in a critical spirit. There are several obvious worries about the 
argument. For example, psychologist Robert C. Nichols raised a serious 
objection. He first reconstructed Flynn's argument and presented it in the 
form of four premises and the conclusion, and then dismissed it as a 
"faulty syllogism", or as an obscurum per obscurius reasoning.'2 But al- 
though this kind of criticism ought to be specially congenial to philoso- 
phers of science, and is moreover published as an immediate response to 
Flynn's paper on which Block so strongly relies, Block's paper contains 
no mention of that highly relevant contribution to the discussion, nor of 
any other of the conspicuous problems with Flynn's reasoning. Again, the 
filter blocked that kind of information. 
3.3. The Spectre of Racism. The next example is Sahotra Sarkar's chap- 
ter "The Obsessions with Heritability" from his book Genetics and Re- 
ductionism. The book came out in the prestigious series Cambridge Studies 
11. In the text Block does briefly discuss some empirical data favoring hereditarianism 
but he seems to treat them as independent arguments (and not as an essential part of 
the inference from WGH to BGH). He faces the dilemma mentioned earlier. If he 
excludes the empirical component of the two-step argument in favor of hereditarianism, 
he is refuting the mere shadow of hereditarianism and is tilting at windmills. If he 
includes it, however, the charge of "conceptual confusions" and "flawed logic" simply 
disintegrates. 
12. "By a strange twist of logic Flynn has transformed the genuine mystery concerning 
test score changes over time into positive evidence that solves the alleged mystery of 
racial differences." (Nichols 1987, 234) Other scholars are also trying to stimulate 
"healthy skepticism" about the Flynn Effect (e.g. Rodgers 2000), warning that the 
phenomenon itself is at present so poorly understood that we should first strive to grasp 
better its nature and meaning, and only then attempt to explain it (or, for that matter, 
use it to explain something else). 
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in Philosophy of Biology, which, despite having started only recently, has 
already given us some extremely important contributions to the field. The 
series is advertised as "publishing the very best work in the philosophy of 
biology". In the case of Sarkar's book, however, the application of these 
high standards is not always visible. 
After uncritically rehashing the old arguments against the use of heri- 
tability (based on the possibility of statistical correlation and statistical 
interaction), Sarkar clinches his attack with a standard speculation about 
motives: "It is hard, therefore, not to suspect that the continued pursuit 
of [heritability] is guided,Zat least to some extent, by non-cognitive, espe- 
cially, political factors." (Sarkar 1998, 92) He mentions three sets of con- 
siderations that point to that conclusion, all of which are utterly inade- 
quate to establish such a sweeping and indiscriminate political accusation. 
I will comment only on two of them, because they nicely illustrate the 
scope of ignorance that cripples philosophical discussions about race, ge- 
netics and IQ. 
(i) Sarkar infers political motivation from the fact that "the traits for 
which [heritability] continues to be pursued often include those carrying 
social judgments, even if they are ill-defined." (Sarkar 1998, 93) After 
giving examples of religiosity and IQ, Sarkar continues: 
Bouchard [ ... ] reports relatively high values of [heritability] for 
"openness," "agreeableness," "conscientiousness," "neuroticism," 
and "extroversion," each of which is a trait that carries socialjudgment. 
(Sarkar 1998, 93; italics added) 
Sarkar's point is very clear: the continued pursuit of heritability must be 
politically motivated because the traits whose heritability is studied often 
include those carrying social judgment, like the five traits mentioned 
(openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and extrover- 
sion). Indeed, why were exactly these five traits singled out for heritability 
studies? One possibility is, as Sarkar suggests, that some people had a 
sinister political intention to take traits "that carry social judgment" and 
then perform a heritability analysis in order to develop the hereditarian 
argument and justify the oppression of certain social groups. 
But acquaintance with some very basic psychology points to a much 
simpler and quite benign explanation for the choice of the quintuple. 
Namely, these five traits are known in psychology as thefive main person- 
ality traits. If one happens to know this, it becomes quite obvious that 
these traits w'ere put in the foreground not by Bouchard, but by the wide 
consensus of personality psychologists. And then, there is absolutely no 
need to invent a right-wing conspiracy of scientists in behavior genetics. 
The traits in question became salient in psychology simply because they 
emerged as very robust results of the systematic empirical research on 
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human personality. (Needless to say, one can also criticize the way these 
traits were picked out as "the big five" but that would be a completely 
different topic, unrelated to discussions about heritability.) 
(ii) Sarkar fortifies his imputation of political motives by introducing 
another consideration as well. He says that it is "hard not to suspect" that 
research on heritability is guided by political factors because "the work 
on [heritability] and IQ has been routinely used to argue for genetic in- 
feriority of certain groups, particularly African-Americans." (1998, 92- 
93) There is no argument here at all. Sarkar just asserts (without offering 
any evidence) that scholars who accept the genetic explanation of the racial 
IQ difference entered this research area just because they wanted to give 
an aura of scientific respectability to their racist prejudices. The crudeness 
of this way of dismissing a whole research program boggles the mind. 
But ironically, Sarkar himself provides the best refutation of his own 
claim. Speaking about those authors who advocated the genetic account 
of the IQ differences between ethnic groups Sarkar gives reference to Rich- 
ard Herrnstein's article "IQ" from Atlantic Monthly (1971) and his book 
IQ in the Meritocracy (1973). In reality, however, Herrnstein at that time 
did not subscribe to the genetic hypothesis about white-black IQ variation. 
In the early 1970s he disagreed with Jensen, and it was only later that he 
changed his mind, and was converted to hereditarianism with respect to 
racial differences. In the book IQ in the Meritocracy, Herrnstein com- 
plained about frequent misinterpretations of his views, and distanced him- 
self from Jensen very explicitly: 
My article took what might be called an explicitly agnostic stand 
on racial (i.e., black white) differences in tested intelligence.... I be- 
lieve that racial and ethnic group differences are hard to pin down as 
regards inheritance. My interest was not race, but social class differ- 
ences. (Herrnstein 1973, 12) 
As one of the authors of The Bell Curve, Herrnstein has become no- 
torious for his views on race, genetics and IQ. This may be a reason why 
many people who did not take trouble to study the sources tend to believe 
that he must then have defended the very same ideas in his writings from 
the early 1970s, which also gave rise to a heated political controversy. But 
although this mistake is in a sense expected from lay readers, it is disturb- 
ing when it is found in a high-profile philosophical publication. 
Another philosopher (by the way, a winner of the Lakatos award for 
philosophy of science) who made the same mistake, is Michael Dummett 
(1981, 295-296). He also accused Herrnstein of racism although at that 
time Herrnstein had resolutely refused to take a stand on issues involving 
race. Rather than being a mere oversight, however, Dummett's error looks 
more like a natural consequence of the quick and perfunctory method he 
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recommends for reaching conclusions in this context. Namely, he claims 
that "it should seem ... obvious that contemporary psychologists in the 
United States and Britain, advancing the thesis of the hereditary inferiority 
of Negro intelligence, are. .. reflecting prejudices still widespread in these 
countries", and that hereditarianism about racial differences and IQ, "so 
obviously conforming to a palpably powerful prejudice, can be set aside 
by any rationaljudge withoutfurther examination" (296, 298, italics added). 
In other words, it is suggested that the views in question can (and should) 
be rejected without looking into the relevant empirical evidence at all! 
Although one cannot help feeling a peculiar sort of admiration for 
Dummett's candor here, the fact that he was ready to publicly defend such 
an idea is yet another indication that the situation in our field has dete- 
riorated to the point that it is necessary to ring the alarm bell. For, it is 
not only that philosophers of science tend to make judgments about cer- 
tain scientific issues without seriously studying the literature, or without 
even properly understanding the theories they attack. Now, in addition, 
we have a thinker of Dummett's stature openly defending an epistemic 
norm that legitimizes this awkward way of forming beliefs. 
4. Conclusion. Why is this small segment of contemporary philosophy of 
science in such a sorry state? On reflection, I prefer to leave this question 
as an exercise for the reader. My aim in this paper is to criticize a deviant 
philosophical trend, not to explain how it came about or why it spread. 
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